Wicked Legal Systems

Review from previous issue: “As a legal story, the book is written with passion and care, and its meaning is clear. He seems to support the argument of legal positivists who insist on a clear conceptual distinction between legal requirements arising from social sources and moral demands. Is the existence of evil legal systems an insurmountable obstacle for critics of positivism who reject the meaning of this distinction? The abstract debates of legal philosophers seem far removed from the practical application of law in the field of judicial decision-making. This book argues that theoretical disagreements are fundamental to legal practice and analyzes the abstract debates of legal philosophy through a detailed study of legal interpretations in apartheid South Africa – a model of the “evil legal system”. The case study shows that certain notions of law and the rule of law determined the reasoning of judges whose decisions supported public policy and judges whose decisions opposed those policies. The first edition of this book was published in 1991. Since then, South Africa has changed and the main legal theoretical debates have shifted from the analysis of the concept of law itself to the analysis of the concept of legality and the value of the rule of law. For this new, fundamentally revised edition, the author discusses the transformation of South Africa since the end of apartheid and the changing direction of legal philosophy. It also examines the emergence of counter-terrorism security laws and the arguments surrounding their compliance with the rule of law. The book provides an invaluable guide to understanding the abstract debates of legal theory and their importance in legal practice. A central debate in the case law concerns the nature of judicial duty in “difficult” cases involving contentious legal issues.

Legal experts believe that judges must exercise a margin of discretion that is ultimately not limited by law in deciding such cases. Ronald Dworkin argued that the decision in such cases is determined by law: judges must apply a “theory of the strongest” that explains and morally justifies. David Dyzenhaus is Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, Associate Dean of Graduate Studies at the Faculty of Law, and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Prior to joining the Faculty of Law in 1990, Professor Dyzenhaus was an Assistant Professor and Canada Research Fellow at Queen`s University Faculty of Law from 1989 to 1991. He has taught law, philosophy and sociology in South Africa, England and Canada. He holds a PhD from the University of Oxford and a BA from the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. In 2002, he was a Law Foundation Visiting Scholar at the University of Auckland Law School. In 2005/06 he was Herbert Smith Visiting Professor at Cambridge Law School and Senior Research Fellow at Pembroke College, Cambridge. Charles T.

Kotuby, Jr., Luke A. Sobota, Center for International Legal Education (CILE), University of Pittsburgh School of Law. See all Google Scholar citations for this article. The file(s) in this dataset are currently under embargo. If you fill out the attached form, we may attempt to contact the author and ask if they are willing to send you a copy solely for your personal research. We will then forward this form and your request to the author and inform you of their response. 1. Judicial obligation and the rule of law2. Case law and racial segregation.3 Justice and national security.4 The revival of the common law and the war on law.5 Cycles of legality: the rule of law after 9/116. Die Genealogie des Rechtspositivismus7.

The legality of legality Your email address will be used to notify you when your comment has been reviewed by the moderator and in case the author of the article or moderator needs to contact you directly. Buchbeschreibung Zustand: Neu. PRINT ON DEMAND Buch; Neu; Schneller Versand aus Großbritannien. Nein. Buch. Seller`s Inventory # ria9780199532216_lsuk 8 Hart, H. L. A., `Legal Duty and Obligation`, Essays on Bentham, Oxford, 1982, S. 151Google Scholar.

Siehe auch Hart, H. L. A., « Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense », Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H. L. A. Hart, Hrsg. Gavison, Ruth, Oxford, 1987, S. 40–2.Google Scholar. Haben Sie Interessenkonflikte? * Interessenkonflikte helfen {{shippingLabel}} {{#showShipPrice}} {{bestListingForDislay.shippingToDestinationPriceInPurchaseCurrencyWithCurrencySymbol}} {{#showSurferCurrency}} ({{bestListingForDislay.shippingToDestinationPriceInSurferCurrencyWithCurrencySymbol}}) {{/showSurferCurrency}} {{/showShipPrice}} {{#showFreeShipping}} {{freeshipping}} {{/showFreeShipping}} {{shippingText}} 7 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Serious, New Impression, Londres, 1984, besonders Kap. 3 et S. 338–53.Google Scholar Envoyez les informations bibliographiques de cette notice à votre adresse e-mail. – No HTML tags allowed- Website URLs are only displayed as text- Lines and paragraphs wrap automatically- Attachments, images or tables are not allowed We need your email address to inform you of the outcome of your request.

2 Fuller, Lon L., “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review, lxxi (1958). Google Scholar 10 For an interesting discussion of the view that not all obligations are moral obligations, see Sartorius, Rolf E., Individual Conduct and Social Norms (Encino, 1975), chap. This specific ISBN output is currently not available. Please add additional information to include in the email. Description of the book Hardcover. Condition: NEW. Clean and crispy and new!. Seller`s inventory # 3530934080 6 Fuller, , “Positivism and Compliance with the Law”, 659.Google Scholar Provide a statement describing the basis of your request for information from the author. Learn more about this | Seller Contact this seller (Stanford users can avoid this captcha by signing up.) Book Description Condition: New.

A+ Customer Service! Satisfaction guaranteed! The book is in NEUWERT. Seller`s inventory # 0199532214-2-1 Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller und Robert H. Sitkoff 9 Dworkin, Ronald, `A Reply by Ronald Dworkin`, Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, ed. Cohen, Marshall, Totowa, 1984, pp. 256-60.Google Scholar 1 Hart, H. L.

A., `Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals`, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford, 1983CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961, p. 1961. 203–7.Google Scholar Please note that all files shared with you as part of your application are subject to the Oxford University Research Archives Terms of Use, unless expressly stated otherwise by the author. 3 Fuller, Lon L., The Morality of Law, revised ed., New Haven, 1971. 4 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law,” 636Google Scholar. See also Fuller, , Morality of Law, chap. 4Google Scholar, and Hart`s commentaries in Hart, H.

L. A., `Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law`, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, pp. 351-3.Google Scholar. Published online by Cambridge University Press: January 26, 2009 13 Dworkin, , Law`s Empire, pp. 178-84.Google Scholar Please list all costs and grants incurred in the last 36 months by organizations whose interests may be affected by the publication of the response at any time during the last 36 months.